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Abstract Border tax adjustment is a second-best solution for improving climate mitigation
measures as long as international cooperation does not function to a satisfactory degree.
However, the implementation of such measures can legally be problematic under the angle
of the legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which aims at liberalizing
international trade and at avoiding trade barriers. In particular, border tax adjustment might
come into conflict with the National Treatment principle and the discipline on subsidies. These
legal problems can only be overcome if the specific legal justification reasons provided for in
WTO law for the promotion of climate sustainability (such as conservation of exhaustible
resources and protection of human, animal or plant health) are interpreted in a broad way.
1 Introduction
Climate Change can only be stopped and its damages limited if all states adopt a common
approach and take joint action to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. More than two decades
have passed since the world community acknowledged this need and established the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Based on the
UNFCC the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was concluded in 1997, which commits its member states
to legally binding emission reduction targets. Nowadays, however, limited membership (major
industrialized countries like the US, Canada, Japan and New Zealand have withdrawn) prevents
the KP to reach ambitious reduction goals and gives rise to justifiable doubts as to whether the
KP is the right legal instrument to combat climate change. A comprehensive follow-up
agreement is planned to be negotiated until 2020, however, chances of success are uncertain.
In the course of the post-Kyoto negotiations, nation states tend to resort to unilateral action
to combat climate change. In developed countries, the concept of restricting trade through
imposing taxes on carbon-intensive product imports (BBorder Tax Adjustments^, BTA) has
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increasingly gained attention: The term BTA was first defined by a working group of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as Bany fiscal measure
that put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle^ (Report of the Working Party,
L/3464). Whereas taxes are generally levied according to the origin principle, BTA are raised
in the country of destination. Since the term BTA can be misleading (also other fiscal measures
than taxes can be adjusted and adjustment does not always take place at the border), scholars
also refer to terms like Bcarbon equalization measures^ (Pauwelyn 2009), BBorder Adjustment
Measures^ (BAMs) or BBorder Carbon Adjustments^ (BCAs).
BTA can mainly be realized by way of three models, namely (i) the levying of carbon taxes
on products from countries with lower production standards (import BTA), (ii) the refund of
domestic taxes on exported products (export BTA) and (iii) the requirement to obtain emission
allowances and to participate in an Emission Trading System (ETS) (Kaufmann and Weber
2011). It is worth mentioning that countries are not obliged to apply import and export BTA
symmetrically. Consequently, a government is free to determine whether to design BTA
measure so as to apply on imports and/or on exports and whether the measure should be
coupled to an emissions allowance system (Cottier et al. 2013).
Domestic measures such as BTA are a unilateral answer to the stagnation of multilateral
solutions. Unilateral action is not prohibited in international climate change law. The KP calls
upon their members to Bimplement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accor-
dance with its national circumstances^ such as enumerated in the Art. 2.1(a)(i)-(viii) KP.
Furthermore, developing Parties to the Protocol have agreed to take BNationally Appropriate
Mitigation Actions^ (NAMAs), referring to mitigation measures to reduce GHG emissions Bin
a manner commensurate with their capacity and in line with their national development goals^
(FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1).
The limits to unilateral action are drawn in Art. 3.5 UNFCCC, which states that Bmeasures
taken to combat climate change including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade^. This
provision establishes the link from international climate change law to international trade law.
Notwithstanding their (arguably) beneficial impacts on GHG reduction, BTA measures run the
risk of being in violation with the rules of international trade law, namely the legal framework
of the World Trade Organization (WTO law). WTO member states are obliged to adhere to
strict non-discrimination rules of national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment
(MFN) and have to refrain from trade-distortive subsidization of exports.
This paper will focus on the legal uncertainties of BTA and only briefly touch upon the
economic and social problems that BTA entail. Section 2 starts with examining issues arising in
the conflicting area of climate change and competitiveness and in this context illuminates the
rationale of BTA. Section 3 addresses issues with regards toWTO law and outlines the provisions
relevant with regards to BTA, presenting a test for WTO-compatibility. Finally, section 4 con-
cludes with a brief summary and an outlook on the possible design and implementation of BTA.
2 Climate change and competitiveness concerns
2.1 Regulating global public goods
Climate change mitigation is the typical global public good: each country’s GHG emissions
contribute cumulatively to the increase of the overall concentration. Global public goods are
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typically defined through two qualities that stem from their public nature (Weber and Menoud
2008): Everybody can derive benefits from the provision of such goods since they are i) non-
rivalrous in consumption and ii) non-excludable. On a global scale, public goods should
benefit humanity as a whole, meaning that public goods ideally fulfil three criteria, namely (i) a
geographically broad scope (benefits to more than one group of countries or regions), (ii) a
social-economic extension (a broad spectrum of the global population, crossing manifold
segments), and (iii) a generational criterion (benefit to the present generations without jeop-
ardizing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs).
Moreover, global warming presents a classic example of the Btragedy of the commons^.
Despite the fact that countries acknowledge the problem (global warming) and the need of a
solution (a global, legally binding treaty), negotiations often fail for the sole reason that
member states cannot agree on fair distribution (who has to commit to what kind of mitigation
actions) and due to the fact that costs for climate change mitigation prevail short-term
(political) benefits and governments are reluctant to cover the costs.
Rules implementing higher climate protection standards usually cause costs and measures
aiming at GHG reduction can have an impact on the international competitiveness of firms.
Since domestic businesses are obliged to comply with such environmental regulations, they
might have to bear costs which are not to be borne by foreign firms. Consequently, legal rules
should be designed in a way that competitiveness is boosted or at least not jeopardized
(Pauwelyn 2007).
2.2 BTA: reconciling climate change and competitiveness?
Usually competitiveness provisions are motivated by economic reasons. Arms-length compe-
tition requires rules to level the playing field. Within the context of climate change mitigation
this would imply that domestic and foreign firms either have to meet equivalent environmental
standards or that disparities with regard to such obligations can be offset. Apart from economic
rationales, non-economic reasons are to be taken into account (Pauwelyn 2007; Lay 2012;
Weber 2014): Firstly, climate change Bis the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever
seen^ (Stern Review 2006) and environmental standards should internalize the social cost of
carbon. Secondly, competitiveness rules can be an instrument to avoid market-shifts to Bdirtier^
producers by dis-incentivizing emission migration and relocation of firms. Finally, since com-
petitiveness rules force importers of carbon intense products to pay the social cost of carbon,
energy-intensive domestic industries might be inclined to accept stricter national environmental
policies and more countries might be encouraged to commit to international efforts to reduce
GHG emissions. Within this context, BTA are often regarded as an instrument to address
economic and non-economic concerns, since they are generally driven by four rationales.
(a) Carbon leakage
The concept of BTA is the best-known measure to offset lax environmental standards
in cross-border trade, implemented in order to prevent so-called carbon leakage. This
term is used to describe the phenomenon of companies from countries with high
environmental production standards moving their production seat to another country
with laxer regulation on GHG emissions, in order to escape the additional cost burden
imposed by climate policies. Carbon leakage is dangerous for at least two reasons: First,
it could lead to an overall increase of worldwide emissions, and secondly, it jeopardizes
competitiveness and economic development of a country and leads to the loss of jobs.
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(b) Level playing field
BTA can serve as a device to ensure a level playing field between countries with high
and such with lax or no environmental policies: Through imposing taxes on imported
products or through the rebate of export products from an additional fiscal burden, BTA
are thought to offset price inequalities and to restore cross-border competitiveness.
Rules implementing higher climate protection standards cause costs for producers of
that country and eventually lead to higher product prices for consumers in the home
market. Foreign producers in countries without environmental regulations can offer the
same products to a lower price and thereby gain a competitive advantage. There are many
reasons why national rules for climate change mitigation should be designed in a way
that the competitiveness is not jeopardized (Pauwelyn 2007), in order to avoid carbon
leakage and market distortions. Against the background of nation states operating
unilaterally without a multilaterally binding agreement based on consensus, it is difficult
to reach arms-length competition with domestic and foreign firms having to meet the
same environmental standards. Competitiveness rules could gap the bridge through
offsetting price-inequalities and restoring cross-border competitiveness.
(c) Leverage
A further motivation behind BTA is the idea that through rules on competitiveness
forcing importers of Bdirtier^ products to pay the social cost of carbon, energy-intensive
domestic industries might also be inclined to accept stricter national environmental
policies (leading to a reduction of emissions) and more countries might be incentivized
to join international efforts in order to cut emissions.
(d) Distributive justice
Apart from competitiveness as such, considerations about distributive justice are to be
taken into account: Distributive justice and social awareness are elements of a broadly
understood concept of global public goods. Derived from such an approach, the question
must be addressed to what extent individuals do have a moral duty to refrain from
causing climate change problems. Carbon leakage as an aspect of competitiveness does
also have an impact on fairness, requiring cooperation in order to mitigate negative
consequences of climate change.
2.3 Challenges and risks
Notwithstanding these advantages, competitiveness rules such as BTA are not a panacea; they
can also cause costs on a national and a global level and bear significant social and political
risks (Pauwelyn 2007; Weber 2014).
(a) Costs
Competitiveness rules bear the risk of amounting to technical barriers to trade. Such
barriers are inefficient in many ways, since they add costs to the production, which will
usually be paid as part of the product price by domestic consumers. Moreover, technical
barriers run the risk of violating WTO law (see infra 4.2.c). Apart from being costly, the
implementation of competitiveness rules is usually complex and accompanied with
complicated administrative burdens.
From an economic point of view, it must be added that competitiveness rules like BTA
measures are only a Bsecond-best solution^: Market-based approaches, like emission
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trading systems or labelling schemes are more desirable, since they allow for an efficient
allocation of resources and encourage environmental-friendly behaviour through price
incentives rather than through regulatory pressure, thereby aligning financial interests and
environmental aims for businesses and individuals.
(b) Undermining multilateralism
Unilateral actions run the risk of undermining the trust necessary for future interna-
tional cooperation and even lead to countervailing actions and trade disputes. This danger
is even more apparent considering the fact that competitiveness rules may also be used as
protectionist tool, if the main motivation behind such rules is neither competition nor
climate change, but purely protectionist purposes. Such a disguised restriction of inter-
national trade would run counter WTO law and can be challenged before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
(c) Common but differentiated responsibilities
Moreover, offsetting measures such as BTA are very controversial from a develop-
ment perspective: Countries with poor environmental standards are often developing and
least developed countries (LDCs). According to the UNFCCC’s principle of Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) developed countries should Btake the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof^ (Article 3.1 UNFCCC). The
rationale behind this principle is that developed countries bear a bigger historical
responsibility for global warming. A Bpunishment^ in form of an additional financial
burden, which BTA would impose on developing countries or LDCs, would be in stark
contradiction to the generally acknowledged CBDR principle and further jeopardize the
already fragile political climate of UNFCCC negotiations.
3 WTO law challenges
Any kind of BTA causes additional costs to the importers of goods. Since these costs can have
a negative impact on cross-border trade and even constitute measures with extraterritorial
effects, they fall within the scope of WTO law and have to be assessed in the light of the
applicable rules.
There are different WTO obligations that might be relevant to BTA. At the heart of the
analysis of WTO compatibility lays the question, whether a regulatory distinction between
products based on their environmental footprint violates the non-discrimination obligations set
forth mainly in Article I and III, but also in Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Furthermore, the question arises whether export BTA amount to an export
subsidy prohibited by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM
Agreement). Apart from these central questions, the test on WTO compliance will briefly
touch upon the increasingly important issue of the legal status of process and production
methods (PPM).
3.1 Most favoured nation principle
The most-favoured-nation principle (MFN) enshrined in Article I:1 GATT is one of the two
key pillars of WTO law. As interpreted by the Appellate Body (AB) in Canada – Autos, this
provision obliges member states not to discriminate between like products originating in or
destined for different countries (WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, para 84).
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BTA do not run the risk of violating the most favoured nation (MFN) principle: tax
measures usually do not distinguish along the lines of the origin of the product; the regulatory
distinction is rather based on carbon concerns.
3.2 National treatment
The national treatment obligation is the second key-concept of WTO law. It prohibits members
from treating imported products less favourably than like domestic products. WTO law does
not contain any provision dealing directly with BTA. The GATT, however, distinguishes
between Binternal taxes and charges^ in Article III GATT and Bother duties or charges of
any kind imposed on or in connection with the importationB (import duty) according to Article
II:1(b) GATT second sentence. Consequently, if the BTA measure at issue qualifies as a tax, it
falls within the scope of Article III:2 GATT and has to meet the criteria set forth therein. If a
challenged measure classifies as an import duty, a test according to Article II GATT applies.
(a) Article III:2 of the GATT
Since BTA can be regarded as Binternal taxes or internal charges of any kind^, Article
III:2 GATT applies, requiring member states not to apply such taxes or internal charges
(i.e., BTA) Bin excess of those applied directly or indirectly to like domestic products.^
Consequently, a carbon tax on imports cannot be levied without an equivalent domestic
tax (Hufbauer et al. 2009). A key issue is the question of the likeness of products: only
Blike products^ need to be treated equally. If a WTO Panel or Appellate Body was to
judge that two products at issue were not Blike^, a claim of violation of the national
treatment principle will not be pursued.
As defined by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (BISD 18S/97) and
reiterated repeatedly in WTO jurisprudence, likeness is assessed based on four criteria: (i)
physical characteristics of a product, (ii) its end-uses, (iii) the competitive relationship,
and (iv) the consumer preferences. Traditionally, the Appellate Body has interpreted the
notion of Blike products^ broadly (Kaufmann and Weber 2011; Lay 2012) putting
emphasis rather on the first three of the criteria. However, in a case where the AB had
to adjudicate upon a French export ban on asbestos, the AB for the first time acknowl-
edged the importance of consumer preferences: It found that products containing asbestos
cannot be considered to be like Basbestos-clean^ products, due to obvious health reasons
(WT/DS135/AB/R of March 12, 2001).
In addition to the assessment of Blikeness^, the test under Article III:2 GATT implies
an assessment of the tax at issue: when the tax on foreign products is Bin excess^ of the
tax for like domestic products, a violation of Article III:2 will be assumed. Whether a tax
is Bin excess^, must be determined based on the actual and not the nominal tax burden
(Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, WT/DS155/R, from 19 December 2000,
paras. 11.182–11.184). As reinforced by the AB in Japan – Alcoholics a strict test applies
and Beven the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much^ (WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/
R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1996, p. 23). Therefore, a national government should be
cautious when determining the amount of the BTA, taking particular care to avoid
levying a higher carbon tax on imported products than on domestic ones.
(b) Article II:2(a) of the GATT
According to Article II GATT, member states are bound to a maximum limit of certain
tariffs in exchange for similar tariff reductions by their trading partners, as set forth in
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their Schedule of Concessions annexed in GATT 1994. Article II:1(b) GATT requires
products benefiting from a bound tariff concession to be Bexempt from ordinary customs
duties as well other duties or charges of any kind in excess of those set forth and provided
in the tariff schedules^. As clarified by the AB in India – Additional Import Duties, the
application of quantitative restrictions, such as tariffs or other customs duties, is in
principle prohibited, but may nevertheless be permissible under Article II:i(b) Bso long
as they do not exceed a member’s bound rates^ (WT/DS360/AB/R, 30 October 2008,
para. 159). The AB further found that Bcharges that are not in justified under Article
II:2(a) GATT are not in breach of Article II:1(b) GATT^ (WT/DS360/AB/R, 30 October
2008, Fn. 320).
Article II:2(a) GATT allows the imposition of two types of import charges: (i)
BCharges equivalent to an internal tax consistently with Article III:2 GATT^ imposed
on imported products that are like domestic products and (ii) charges imposed on
Barticles from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole
or in part^ (Kaufmann andWeber 2011). Therefore, a BTA measure challenged under the
first sentence of Article II:2(a) GATT would have to be tested under the same criteria as
under Article III:2 GATT (see above) in order to determine whether it was applied Bin
excess of^ the internal tax .
(c) Article 2.2 TBT Agreement
A similar line of argument looks at the assessment of environmentally preferable
products as technical regulations or standards under the Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) Agreement. WTO member states are obliged to consider their non-
discrimination obligation when adopting technical regulations. According to Article 2.2
TBTAgreement, member states Bshall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade^. (Hsueh 2013). The Appellate Body has interpreted Article 2.2 TBT
Agreement in the US – Certain Country Of Origin Labelling (COOL) case (WT/DS 384/
AB/R of June 29, 2012) quite strictly. As a consequence, a country intending to increase
the level of environmental protection would bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that
such measures do not constitute technical trade barriers. Insofar, a more liberal interpre-
tation of terms such as Blegitimate objective of measures^ appear to be necessary in order
to give incentives to countries implementing rules for environmentally sensitive produc-
tion methods (Weber 2014; Hsueh 2013).
3.3 Process and production methods
Process and production methods (PPM) look at the origins of products, i.e., at the way in
which they have been processed or produced. Article III:2 GATT reads as follows: Bproducts
… shall not be subject, directly or indirectly…^ which has been interpreted as enabling the
adjustment of taxation of inputs in the final product. Generally speaking, however, the
differentiation between products according to PPM is controversially debated and existing
case law would suggest that discriminatory measures based on PPM are not permitted without
reservation under the GATT (Kaufmann and Weber 2011). In the case of US – Tuna (Mexico),
the GATT Panel distinguished between measures that Baffect products as such^ and measures
that do not (DS21/R, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD39S/155). The Panel’s approach has
led to the understanding that PPM are only to be considered in the assessment of products’
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likeness if they manifest themselves in the Bproducts as such^. In other words, product-related
PPM-based measures are applied in order to guarantee the quality, safety, and functionality of
the product and are usually directly detectable in the end product (Kaufmann andWeber 2011).
The qualification of non-product-related PPM-based measures, such as the amount of
energy consumed in the manufacturing process or environmentally friendly production stan-
dards, are more controversial. The root of the debate has to be seen in the fact that, by limiting
the imports of products compounded in a specific manner, exporters from other countries may
face difficulties to access such a market, as they have to adapt their domestic PPM in order to
comply with specific requirements called for/by the importing State.
The WTO’s finding in the Asbestos case that fundamental human health risks are relevant
when assessing the likeness of products was conceived as an important signal, suggesting that
the GATT can be interpreted in a way that allows domestic environmental regulations for
imported goods based on environmental concerns. This interpretation would imply that the
importation of a carbon intensive product may be restricted without violating the national
treatment obligation. This interpretation is further reiterated by a former GATT Panel which in
a case concerning automobile taxes found that high-fuel efficient cars are not Blike^ gas-
guzzling cars (DS31/R of October 11, 1994).
However, the WTO case law mentioned above does not reveal whether other policy
objectives such as the protection of the environment or human health considerations in more
general terms could also be considered when examining the likeness of products. Another
reservation concerns the health risks as such: in certain cases (for example asbestos) the risks
are internationally acknowledged by experts, whereas the assessment of more controversial
substances might lead to debates. Therefore, it is not completely clear yet to what extent
environmental policies may influence the likeness of products (Kaufmann and Weber 2011).
As a consequence, no prediction can be made as to whether and how the debate on PPM
will be solved in the BTA context. Instead, by doing the examination of the competitive
relationship between comparable products as a criterion for likeness a special focus should be
set on consumer preferences. If consumers distinguish between products based on the applied
PPM, irrespective of whether these are product or non-product related, it seems to be justified
to consider PPM in the assessment of Blike products^ (Kaufmann and Weber 2011). However,
the burden of proof to demonstrate the existence of such prevalent consumer-preferences
would lie on the responding party.
3.4 Subsidies
Governmental financial support or fiscal incentives can also cause problems under the SCM
Agreement of the WTO. During the time period between 1995 and 1999, environmental
subsidies promoting sustainability of production were exempted from the WTO legal disci-
plines. This exemption, however, expired at the beginning of 2000 without being renewed and
therefore, countries now have only limited tools to encourage industries to adapt greener
technologies or promote environmentally preferable products.
The WTO AB has emphasized that countries, in principle, have the sovereign authority to
levy taxes and also to relieve certain categories of revenues from taxes. But notwithstanding
this sovereignty, the member states have the duty to respect their WTO obligations
(WT/DS108/AB/R, 24 February 2000, para. 90). Favourable tax treatment and other fiscal
incentive can qualify as a Bsubsidy^ within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, if two criteria
are met: The tax exemption is a Bgovernment revenue that is otherwise due^ (Article
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1.1.(a)(1)(ii) SCMAgreement) and confers a benefit to the person or company excluded from the
tax (Article 1.1.(b) SCM Agreement). As stated by the Panel and reiterated by the AB in US –
FSC the term Botherwise due^ implies a Bbut for test^, i.e., a comparison based on Bthe situation
that would prevail but for the measures in question^ (WT/DS108/R, Panel Report from 8
October 1999, para. 7.45). Since export BTA are tax rebates that are granted Bbut for^ the
BTA measure, they qualify as Brevenue otherwise due^. Furthermore, the tax relief confers a
Bbenefit^ (Article 1.1.(b) SCM Agreement) to the exporter, since it leaves him Bbetter off^
compared to other market actors. Therefore, BTA measures meet both criteria of Article 1.1.
SCM and can be challenged under the SCM Agreement.
Nevertheless, the SCM Agreement does not prohibit subsidies per se, only subsidies
contingent upon export performance or import substitution subsidies are illegal (Article 3
SCM Agreement). However, there is a high probability that a challenged BTA measure would
fall under the category of export subsidies, since BTA usually directly and de lege aim at
exempting exporters from tax duties that non-exporting market actors bear.
3.5 Legal justifications for trade barriers
If BTA are critical in view of the application of the WTO principles, the question arises
whether justification reasons can be applied. WTO law contains a list of specific justifications
contained in Article XXGATTand Article XIVof the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). If a measure is motivated by one of the listed justification reasons, it is considered to
be legitimated, even if it violates WTO-law. The list of reasons is based on justified non-trade
policies, provided that such interests are adequately balanced against the objective of free trade
(Kaufmann and Weber 2011; Lay 2012).
With regards to BTA, two justification reasons aiming at environmental protection and
sustainability might apply: The first provision exempts measures aimed at the Bconservation of
exhaustible resources^ (Article XX(g) GATT), the second one those ^necessary for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health^ (Article XX(b) GATT). However,
justification under Article XX(g) GATT is likely to fail, since it would be difficult for a
respondent to prove a strong nexus between the challenged BTA measure and the conservation
of exhaustible resources. Also justification under Article XX(b) GATT is uncertain:
Traditionally, the WTO Panels and the AB have interpreted the scope of these justification
reasons rather narrowly and have been reluctant to accept justifications based on human,
animal or plant health (see for example Brazil –Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB, adopted 17
December 2007).
Even if specific BTA measures fall under any of the listed justification reasons, such a
measure still has to be necessary and proportional. In the previous WTO jurisprudence,
environmental or health policy choices made by countries have not been challenged if the
application of the respective policies was necessary and proportional and if there was no
alternative reasonably available. Consequently, the focus must be put on the relationship
between the measure at stake and the legitimate environmental policies; a country needs to
demonstrate that the measure is apt to produce a substantial contribution to the achievement of
its objective (Kaufmann and Weber 2011).
Established jurisprudence gives good guidelines on how to structure and design the
necessity/proportionality test implying different steps: (i) The concerned country has to
determine whether the measure is indispensable to reach the policy goals. The measure is
only acceptable if no other less restrictive means are readily available. Depending on the given
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circumstances, however, this criterion is not always easy to fulfil. (ii) If the measure is not
indispensable or its efficiency cannot be proven, the second step of the proportionality test
applies: the public policy interest of protecting the resources or human health needs to be
balanced against the interest of liberalized trade. The weight of sustainability considerations/
environmental needs must be higher than the benefits of trade. This test can rely on interna-
tional agreements and resolutions such as the UNFCCC Framework, the Kyoto Protocol or
further agreements, which emphasize that member states shall give particular relevance to
climate change considerations. (Kaufmann and Weber 2011).
Finally, the measure must be applied so as not to create an arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination or as not to lead to disguised restrictions on international trade as required by
the Chapeau of Article XX GATT (Lay 2012; Weber 2014).
4 Conclusion
BTA are a controversial matter, from a legal as well as from an ecological, economic and
political perspective. This paper focused on the legal uncertainties of the issue and has carried
out a test on WTO compatibility in order to answer the question of how to design BTA in way
compatible with international law.
Generally speaking, BTA are legally less problematic when implemented as part of an
emission allowances system, for example in the form of the ETS of the European Union
(WTO-UNEP Report 2009; Kaufmann and Weber 2011) due to the fact that a trading system is
more easily apt to reflect market mechanisms. This reduces the risk of having a market
distortive impact and thereby violating WTO law.
However, import BTAwhich are not implemented through an emission allowance system are
also generally permitted under the WTO law, provided they meet certain criteria as set forth in
Articles II and III GATT. Therefore, it is important for governments to design BTA as an indirect
product tax within the scope of Articles II or III GATT. The design should be such that a Bnexus^
between the tax and the product is established. Such a nexus exists if carbon taxes aim at creating
a level playing field between Blike products^ in the country of destination (Kaufmann andWeber
2011). Furthermore, such a tax will only be considered compatible with the WTO’s national
treatment principle, if the tax burden imposed on imported products is not Bin excess^, i.e., equal
in term of the actual tax burden, compared to the tax imposed on domestic products.
Import BTA in violation of WTO law could still be legitimized if considered to fall within
the scope of the legal justification reasons provided for in Article XX GATT. WTO-
incompatible BTA may be justified either on grounds of Article XX(b) GATT (Bnecessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health^) or of Article XX(g) GATT (Brelating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources^). However, the WTO adjudicators have tradi-
tionally applied a strict test for these justification reasons, allowing only measures which aim
directly at the preponderant public interest at issue and are proportional to be exempt from the
non-discrimination obligations.
Even if import BTA were permissible under WTO law, export BTA would very likely be
considered to be a prohibited export subsidy in violation of Article 3.1 SCM Agreement. Since
the justification reasons in Article XX GATT (arguably) do not apply on subsidies and the
SCM Agreement itself does not encompass any justification reasons, a violation of the SCM
Agreement could not be justified through preponderant policy objectives, such as environ-
mental concerns.
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However, apart from legal concerns, the overall justification of BTA is disputed: From an
economic point of view, market-based instruments (such as emission trading systems or
labelling schemes) seem to be more cost-efficient and leave more room for economic devel-
opment, both for domestic industries as well as for cross-border trade (if designed properly).
From a political perspective, BTA run the risk of undermining the multilateral efforts in
provoking retaliatory measures and running counter the UNFCCC’s CBDR-principle.
Notwithstanding these doubts, climate change is the most crucial global problem of our
times. It is widely acknowledged that climate change mitigation and adaption measures are
best concluded on an international level through an internationally binding and enforceable
legal agreement. However, against the background of missing international consensus and the
highly uncertain prospects regarding the conclusion of an international agreement in time,
policy makers are under pressure to act. Therefore, second-best solutions are to be considered
and the implementation of BTA mechanisms seems to be a viable approach. Indeed, BTA
measures, depending on their precise design, run the risk of violating WTO law, particularly
the national treatment principle and the rules on subsidies. Thus, countries implementing BTA
measures run the risk of being challenged before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism,
whose decisions are biding upon Member States. Nevertheless, in recent cases the WTO
Panels and AB have interpreted the justification reasons in a broader way, particularly the
Bexhaustion of natural resources^ (Article XX(g) GATT) and the protection of health (Article
XX(b) GATT). In addition, the consequence of not complying with WTO commitments
Bonly^ consists in the invalidation of the respective measure; monetary sanctions are relatively
unlikely. If this approach would be acknowledged, a certain degree of climate mitigation could
be achieved until the international community comes to a Bglobal^ understanding of measures
to be implemented world-wide.
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